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A B S T R A C T
This paper revisits the arguments put forward by policy-makers about the ongoing crisis of public 
pension systems. Demographic ageing, high contribution rates, present or future fiscal deficits of the 
social security budgets, and low productivity levels – all these factors have been identified as the roots 
of pension crises in various countries. We analyze these conceptualizations of the pension crises in the 
context of Central and Eastern European political economies. We argue that considering demographic 
ageing or the fiscal condition of the pension budget akin to a crisis is unwarranted. By contrast, we 
link the notion of a pension crisis to productivity levels, and subsequently evaluate whether an increase 
in labor productivity can serve as a solution to the financial strain of public PAYG schemes in Central 
and Eastern Europe. We find that dependence on foreign direct investments might be a significant 
hindering factor, and conclude that even sizeable increases in productivity levels might fail to resolve the 
financing difficulties of public PAYG systems in Central and Eastern Europe. Under these circumstances, 
austerity, especially increases in the retirement age accompanied by policies of active ageing, appear to 
be the most acceptable solution to the fiscal problems of exiting PAYG pension systems.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The issue of old-age pension provision has become one of the most prominent social-policy topics 
in the past decades. Economists, political scientists and sociologists have devoted considerable effort 
to studying the impact of various pension policies on the national economy, the political processes 
leading to pension reforms, as well as the social implications of retrenchment in old-age social security. 
Observing the emphasis put on demographic ageing, a process that is gaining impetus around the 
world, it appears likely that pension policies will remain in the focus of the social sciences also in the 
years to come.
This study contributes to the ongoing pension-debate by investigating the link between productivity 
levels and pension system finances, with a particular emphasis on the impact of dependence on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) on the political economy of pension reforms. We start by outlining the 
relationship between labor productivity and old-age pensions. It is commonly accepted in the mainstream 
pension-economics literature that the adverse effects of an increase in the old-age dependency ratio 
can, at least partly, be mitigated by growing labor productivity (e.g. Augusztinovics 1999; Barr 2002; 
Simonovits 2002; Barr and Diamond 2009; Barr 2012).  Building on this literature, we argue that 
public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems enter a genuine fiscal crisis when increases in productivity 
levels cannot cover current outlays. This is evident in countries whose economies are dependent on 
FDI.  We argue that due to their structural conditions, countries heavily dependent on FDI are likely to 
profit from labor productivity increases to a limited extent only. Higher wages, increased social-security 
contributions and higher tax revenues are not easy to come by in an intensifying bidding war to attract 
FDI. This, in turn, limits the maneuvering space of domestic policy makers, especially when it comes 
to financing extensive welfare programs such as public PAYG pension systems.
The above argument is discussed in greater detail within the context of the Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEECs). For the past two decades, these nations have been involved in a fierce 
competition for FDI. As a consequence, the wage share of labor declined in most CEECs, together 
with taxes on corporate profit. We argue that labor’s declining share in the national product is one of 
the key factors that contribute to the fiscal crisis of the public PAYG pension systems. If this tendency 
is to continue further, productivity increases, even if present, are an unlikely solution for the financing 
difficulties of the public PAYG pension schemes in the CEECs. Thus, austerity in old-age social security 
appears inevitable, even at high levels of economic growth.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section one summarizes the most important arguments 
used in the recent pension discussion in the public policy and social science literatures. Section two 
discusses the link between labor productivity and public PAYG pension systems. Section three provides 
an explanation of how FDI dependence might have a long-lasting impact on the political economy of 
pension reforms. The final section discusses the implications of our argument for the pension systems’ 
reform alternatives that governments in CEECs currently face.
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1 .  D O M I N A N T  D I S C O U R S E S  A B O U T  T H E  P E N S I O N  C R I S I S
Pension crisis is one of the most resonant catchphrases that dominate social policy studies since the mid-
1990s. The phrase started its career both in academia and the public policy discourse beginning with 
the publication of the World Bank’s (WB) Averting the Old Age Crisis in 1994 (World Bank 1994). In 
its report, the institution argued that, especially in developing countries, public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
pension systems face an impending fiscal crisis due to the pressures stemming from population ageing, 
the maturation of public PAYG pension systems, high levels of social security coverage in developed 
countries, easy access to early retirement benefits, already high contribution rates and insufficient 
increases in national productivity levels (World Bank 1994, 140). The antidote, as the WB famously 
claimed, is the retrenchment of the public PAYG pension systems to paying minimum flat-rate pensions 
and the introduction of earnings related benefits to be provided through mandatory savings accounts. 
In the WB’s view, in the short term, the pension crisis was reflected in the high levels of 
contributions used to finance benefits for an ever growing population of retirees and in the negative 
fiscal balances of the social security budgets. WB economists, such as Robert Holzmann, argued that 
‘even balanced pension schemes create fiscal problems when high contribution requirements crowd out 
general government revenue, such as income taxes, or soak up debt capacity that would be better used 
for long-term investment’ (Holzmann 2000, 13). Paradoxically, social security contribution rates were 
thus among the first items to be changed if countries were to avoid a pension crisis. With almost no 
exceptions, advice given by the WB to Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) contained 
recommendations to reduce the rate of contributions and, at the same time, shift the burden of social 
security taxes towards employees (Andrews and Rashid 1996). 
The belief that high payroll taxes were one of the main culprits for the labor market problems that 
CEECs faced during the transition period, led the institution to advocate for substantive cuts in social 
security contribution rates. These cuts were assumed  to have a positive impact on the revenues of the 
social security budgets since decreases in the level of contribution rates were believed to help improve 
the tax collection rates, reduce the informal economy, and ultimately reduce social security deficits. The 
beneficial impact of lower contribution rates would be augmented by partly shifting them onto private 
accounts. One of the main aims of privatization was thus to increase the incentives for workers to 
participate in pension schemes and expand coverage by reducing the flow of workers into the informal 
sector (Devesa-Carpio and Vidal-Meliá 2002; Edwards and Cox Edwards 2002). 
Privatization as a solution to labor-market problems was seen as being particularly important in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where tax evasion and participation in the informal sector was easy 
and there was no predictable link between contributions and benefits provided by the state. Shifting to 
mandatory private accounts was believed to solve labor market issues by increasing employers’ ability to 
hire workers and ‘encourage people to remain in work longer’ (Disney and Whitehouse 1999). High-
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profile proponents of the pension-privatization agenda in CEE still claim that the reform is badly 
needed in order to increase incentives for joining the official economy (Bokros 2013), because they 
forge a strong and well-identifiable link between past contributions and future benefits. In addition, as 
Brooks (2006) emphasizes, seemingly detaching pension provision from the public budgets was a policy 
shift welcomed by workers often distrustful of the state. By contrast, it was rarely discussed that the 
incentives through which pension privatization supposedly increases labor market participation rely on 
the maintenance, or even exacerbation of social inequalities (see Ebbinghaus and Neugschwender 2011). 
For example, in praising Bulgaria for following its advice in passing pension privatization and 
pension retrenchment reforms, the WB noted in its 2003 country report that the further ‘easing of 
the overall tax burden, especially payroll taxes, is highly desirable to boost employment and reduce tax 
evasion’ (World Bank 2003, 9). Nevertheless, more than a decade after the reform, evidence for the 
change in pension system coverage that is attributable to the introduction of private accounts in this 
country points in the opposite direction. Participation in the informal labor market remained high 
(Wallace and Latcheva 2006) while the social security tax collection did not improve but worsened, 
which caused the public pension system to run an all-time high fiscal deficit. 
Furthermore, the WB argued that, in the long term, the main problem of the public PAYG pension 
systems is their sensitivity to demographic changes. Low fertility rates and increased life expectancy 
were argued to amount to a demographic time bomb that is set to explode in the upcoming decades, 
once baby boomers begin retiring (World Bank 1994; Holzmann 2000; Holzmann, MacKellar, and 
Rutkowski 2003). Projections of old-age dependency rates and expenditure ratios were used to show 
that in the long term public PAYG pension systems are likely to become more expensive and thus 
more dependent on higher levels of taxation. For example, the WB projected that in countries such 
as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia the share of elderly (population older than 65) on the 
total population would rise by 8 per cent by 2025 (Chawla, Betcherman, and Banerji et al. 2007, 
6). More generally, in CEECs, the WB argued that population decline will take place at a faster 
pace in comparison with other countries due to the region’s specific demographic legacy and the 
population decline associated with the transition to a market economy (Chawla, Betcherman, and 
Banerji et al. 2007).
Importantly, the WB claimed that public PAYG pension systems ‘have major effects on labor and its 
productivity, on capital accumulation and its allocation, on the ability of governments to finance public 
goods and services - and therefore on the growth of the economy (World Bank 1994, 120). The WB 
further stated that public schemes financed through payroll taxes hinder the demand side of the labor 
market, thus making employers less likely to hire new labor force, while also making early retirement 
and moonlighting more likely. By comparison, a private pension system would have a positive impact 
on the labor and capital markets as it would ‘reduce labor market distortions and accelerate financial 
market development and promote saving and capital market accumulation’ (Castello Branco 1998, 26). 
However, evidence for the negative economic impact of public PAYG systems is mixed (Beattie and 
McGillivray 1995; Samwick 1998). At the same time, the impact of private pillars on aggregate saving 
rates is inconclusive (Barr 2005). Similarly, hopes concerning increased participation in the official 
economy seem overly optimistic after more than a decade-long experience with funded schemes. As 
Simonovits (2002; 2011) points out, such expectations are unlikely to materialize in the real economy. 
After all, declaring income earned in the grey economy does not only go hand-in-hand with the 
requirement to pay old-age pension contributions, but also general taxes and other payments unrelated 
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to old-age social security. Finally, expectations concerning private schemes’ contribution to economic 
growth also require a re-evaluation, as a large part of the portfolios were invested in government bonds 
(see Naczyk and Domonkos forthcoming) instead of serving as capital for the domestic economy. 
More than a decade later, writing about CEE, the WB itself recognized that ‘demographic trends 
in the region do not inevitably mean problems for the labor market’ (Chawla, Betcherman, and Banerji 
et al. 2007, 15). But probably the most important change in the WB’s ideas came with the recognition 
that ‘relatively small changes could lead to much better outcomes’ (Schwarz et al. 2014, 259) and that 
shifting to mandatory savings accounts is a costly strategy that requires additional ‘fiscal resources to 
pay for the transition costs’ (Schwarz et al. 2014, 258). These recent conclusions suggest that the WB 
shifted its focus from dogmatically advocating for the introduction of mandatory savings accounts 
towards a more nuanced approach that considers adjustments in the parameters of the PAYG systems 
to be more efficient in dealing with the demographic ageing problem. 
The WB’s arsenal of arguments gained a significant visibility in academia, where they received 
implicit acceptance, especially from scholars working on the political economy of pension reforms. 
For instance,  Armeanu (2010, 16) notes that ‘a pension crisis may not be manifest, but may be 
expected in the near future, as indicated by an ageing population and a projected decline in the ratio 
of contributors to beneficiaries in the pension fund’. In a similar vein, Guardiancich (2013) argues 
that the different social, economic, and demographic problems that marked the transitions from state 
to market in CEE, contributed to the deterioration of the fiscal situation of the public PAYG systems, 
and led to the ‘normative de-legitimization of such schemes’. Although he concedes that WB reform 
proposals have ‘doubtful economic advantages’ he does not discuss further why this is the case or what 
the implications of his claim are. Scholars concentrating on Western European processes of pension 
privatization (e.g. Ebbinghaus and Neugschwender 2011; Ebbinghaus 2015) are also prone to forging a 
direct link between demographic processes and the financial health of the pension system, often citing 
the analytical output of the WB. 
The explanation for this implicit acceptance of the WB’s ideas about pension reform is to be found 
in the nature of the questions that social policy scholars asked. Most of the political economy literature 
did not focus on questioning the assumptions that came implicitly with the WB proposals. Instead, 
scholarly literature devoted more interest to what made possible the introduction of mandatory savings 
accounts in countries of Latin America and Eastern Europe (Mesa-Lago and Müller 2002; Orenstein 
2009a; 2009b). A host of explanations coming from this literature found that the introduction of 
mandatory private accounts was facilitated by existing fiscal problems in the public systems (Müller 
2001), transnational campaigns that efficiently advocated for privatization (Orenstein 2009a), or the 
coming to power of a pro-reform, liberal center-right coalition of parties (Armeanu 2010). The focus 
was thus on the outcome of privatizing reforms rather than on the economic rationale that made 
privatization more desirable in comparison with adjusting and preserving public PAYG pensions systems. 
Moreover, very little space was devoted to discussing what productivity means to the stability of existing 
pension systems despite the fact that variation in productivity levels may play a more important role 
for the fiscal stability of the pension systems than demographic processes. Once productivity assumes 
its proper place in the theoretical discussion on pension crisis, it will be possible to evaluate if the WB 
proposals fit the political economies of CEE.
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2 .  W H AT  I S  A  G E N U I N E  P E N S I O N  C R I S I S
2.1. Public discourse in the light of pension economics
In the previous sections, we have provided a brief discussion of how the pension crisis is commonly 
conceptualized in the international debate about policy reforms and how this was reflected in academia. 
As the examples have shown, the pension crisis-discourse revolves around the deficit of the public 
PAYG system or of the social security system as a whole, too high contributions, demographic adversity 
and productivity. Nevertheless, when analyzing the sustainability of pension systems in CEECs, the 
literature has so far neglected the importance of FDI-reliance. This structural-economic factor is likely 
to be a significant constraint in the politics of pension provision. While, the deficit of the social security 
system and demographic adversity are all conditions worthy of mentioning when discussing pension 
provision, they are not particularly helpful in exploring the roots of the problem.
Firstly, while the deficit of the social security system and high contributions are a common symptom 
of a pension crisis, they are not equal to the crisis as such. In fact, there may be a multitude of causes 
that might lead to high deficits in the social security system, or require governments to levy high social 
security contributions on declared income. Insufficient funding of the social security system may stem 
from the state bureaucracy’s inability to collect tax revenue and social security contributions efficiently 
enough. Moreover, the necessity to levy high taxes and social security contributions on declared income 
is often a direct consequence of low bureaucratic capacity. If the bureaucratic apparatus of the state is 
not efficient in rounding up the grey economy, then the taxes levied on income honestly declared by 
taxpayers need to be increased. The preconditions for bureaucratic weakness in revenue collection were 
to a large extent given by the state-socialist legacy. Easter (2002) emphasizes that, while state socialist 
bureaucracies had a rather elaborate system of taxing state-owned firms, their administrative know-
how was of limited relevance in the new market economy. This may be particularly true for extracting 
social security contributions in an environment ever more dominated by atypical labor contracts, a 
phenomenon becoming apparent across the CEECs (Gebel 2008). Moreover, wide-spread corruption 
further undermines tax subjects’ willingness to join the official economy (Johnson et al. 2000) as well 
as the state’s capacity to extract revenue. 
Secondly, deficits and surpluses in the social security sub-account of the general budget are 
easily influenced by political decisions about the technicalities of revenue collection. The Czech fiscal 
reform carried out by Mirek Topolánek’s center-right government in 2008 demonstrates that social-
security deficit is a rather malleable social construct. In 2008, the Czech government was discussing 
a decrease in the income tax from 15 per cent to 12.5 per cent (Týden.cz 2008).  Instead, as a result 
of political negotiations, it was the social security contributions that were decreased from 34 per cent 
to 31.5 per cent, thus raising the deficit of the social security system. This increase in the perceived 
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social security deficit was later used to justify the re-opening of the debate on the introduction of a 
mandatory private funded pillar into the Czech pension system, and allowing a partial opt-out from 
the state-run PAYG scheme.
Thirdly, demographic adversity is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for a pension crisis 
to occur. Changing demographic conditions, especially increases in the share of the elderly population 
of the total population may lead to a pension crisis, if the aggregate output of the national economy 
suffers due to them. Demographic ageing incites a pension crisis if and only if it causes a decline 
in the aggregate output. This is not to say that a decrease in the number of workers and/or a rising 
number of pensioners does not lead to a financial strain in the pension system. However, as long as 
demographic ageing does not cause a decline in the aggregate output, considering the rising deficit of 
the social security system, even if occurring concomitantly with a growing old-age dependency ratio, 
to be an unequivocal evidence of an impending pension crisis is, yet again, unwarranted. For instance, 
an increase in the productivity of the labor force can offset the negative effect of a shrinking workforce 
on aggregate output.  At least in theory, this should allow the state to finance its public PAYG pension 
system with much less difficulty than the demographic doomsday scenarios would assume.  
However, in economies strongly relying on FDI, there is another issue that requires careful 
evaluation. Low wage levels constitute an essential part of competition for FDI (Bohle and Greskovits 
2012). This orientation of the national economy has its bearing on social security policy as well. If 
wages are low, the functioning of the PAYG pension system will require increased contribution rates, 
assuming the government is committed to providing pensioners with a living income. Finally, the two 
afore-mentioned factors, i.e. low bureaucratic capacity and the use of low wages in the competition for 
FDI, are often present simultaneously. This indicates that considering a crisis in the financing of the 
PAYG pillar equal to a genuine pension crisis is not warranted.    
The above discussion of the financing of the social security system, demographic ageing and 
pension crisis has shown that the current state of the public discourse on pensions is overly simplistic. 
What is missing is a clear linkage between the notions of pension crisis, economic productivity and 
how productivity increases are reflected in a society. As mainstream pension economics has already 
shown (e.g. Barr 2012; Barr and Diamond 2006; 2009), the two concepts are intimately connected. 
Exploring this connection in greater detail allows a deeper understanding of why, what at first sight 
appears to be a pension crisis, is often better understood as a crisis of state capacity or the consequence 
of foreign investment driven development of the national economy. 
2.2. Labor productivity, wages and the social security system
A basic tenet of the pension-economics literature is that the pension system is a mechanism allowing 
intergenerational redistribution within the national economy (e.g. Barr 2012). The pre-working-age, the 
working-age and the elderly population have each their share of aggregate consumption. Distribution 
towards the pre-working age population takes place in the family, while the elderly typically rely on 
the national pension system. This might be organized as a PAYG scheme, a fully-funded system, or 
a combination of the two. While the discussion about the technicalities of organizing the pension 
system has received a lot of attention in the past two decades, much less has been said about the 
importance of productivity. This is a considerable weakness of the ongoing pension debate in the 
political-economy literature: the knife used for cutting the pie seems more important than the size 
and quality of the pie itself.
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The discussion on demographic processes and their relation to the pension system in sub-section 
2 has already provided a hint why labor productivity is of key importance for the national pension 
system. If less labor input is able to produce the same amount of output, the amount to be distributed 
between generations remains also the same. If this is the case, a PAYG pension system should not suffer 
due to demographic ageing. In theory, this should hold even if the only source of revenue for the PAYG 
social security scheme is social security contributions levied by the state on wages. According to the 
marginal productivity theory of wages, wages are to increase with increasing productivity. Therefore, 
the aggregate wage bill of the economically active population should be large enough to allow social 
security to collect revenue needed for pensions.
An empirically relevant explanation of the importance of workers’ income for the social security 
system is provided by Eisner (1997), in his discussion of the financing of U.S. social security. Eisner (1997) 
argues that the financing difficulties of U.S. social security, stemming from the projected increase in the 
dependency ratio will have to be covered by higher taxes on income. A percentage change in net income 
per capita of -14.2 relative to the 1995-level would be needed to keep the social security budget balanced 
up to 2075 (see Table 4.1 on p. 50 in Eisner 1997). In other words, workers should accept to put up with 
14.2 per cent less disposable income, and so should pensioners. In practice, this calculation implies that 
taxes for the economically active should increase substantially, while the old-age pension replacement 
rate should decrease in order to keep the social security budget in balance. However, if we also assume 
that productivity increases lead to a yearly increase in the net income of just one per cent, the income of 
an average worker in 2075 should be 121.7 per cent higher than the income of an average worker in 1995. 
Giving up 14.2 per cent from this amount still leaves an average worker in 2075 significantly better off 
than his peer from 1995. In a similar vein, while ageing may require future pensioners to accept a lower 
replacement rate, the real value of their pensions may still be larger than that of cohorts retiring in times 
when demographic pressures were barely felt, but labor productivity was lower. 
However, as a number of empirical studies have shown (e.g. Harrison 2005; Jayadev 2007), the 
wage share of aggregate output is heavily influenced by a number of factors, capital account openness 
and capital intensity included. Jayadev (2007) demonstrates that, in high- and middle-income nations, 
capital account openness has a negative impact on the share of labor’s wages on output. The reasons 
for this are to be found primarily in the weakened bargaining position of labor vis-á-vis an ever 
more mobile capital. Empirical evidence in this line is also provided by Guscina (2006), who finds 
that economic openness and a weaker bargaining power of labor lead to decreasing income and 
compensation shares. Furthermore, Harrison’s (2005) enquiry into this question has shown that it is 
especially workers in less capital-intensive production who are likely to have a smaller wage share on 
the output produced. 
In the FDI-dependent economies of CEE, wage levels are likely to be negatively influenced by 
reliance on capital from abroad. Dependence on ever more mobile capital will keep the wage share on 
the aggregate output low, while the profit share will soar. A crude cross-country comparison provided 
in Figure 1 indeed shows that Europe appears divided with respect to these two macro-variables. 
The share of employees’ compensation on the output in the overwhelming majority of old EU-
member countries is above forty-five per cent, in some cases significantly exceeding this benchmark. 
By contrast, in CEECs, the share of employees’ compensation on the output reaches values closer to 
thirty-five per cent. 
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Figure 1: Employers’ compensation and profit shares of output as a % of GDP, CEECs and EU15 
compared (average 2004-2013)
Note:  AT=Austria, BE=Belgium, BG=Bulgaria, CY=Cyprus, CZ=Czech Republic, DE=Germany, DK=Denmark, 
EE=Estonia, FI=Finland, FR=France, GR= Greece, HU=Hungary, HR=Croatia, IE=Ireland, IS=Iceland, IT=Italy, 
LU=Luxemburg, LT= Lithuania, LV=Latvia, MT=Malta, MK=Macedonia, NL=Netherlands, PL=Poland, PT=Portugal, 
RO=Romania, SE=Sweden, SI=Slovenia, SK=Slovakia, UK=United Kingdom.
Source: Eurostat database, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database, series nama_10_gdp.
The share of corporate profit on the GDP also shows a rather clear tendency to differ between 
the old EU member states and CEECs. Gross operating surplus and mixed income1 constitute a larger 
share of the GDP in CEECs than in Western Europe. The share of profit on aggregate output in Eastern 
European economies generally reaches values close to or above fifty per cent. The same indicator for 
Western European economies is most commonly between thirty-five and forty-five per cent.   
This trend has two consequences. To begin with, as social security sub-accounts of the state budget 
in European countries rely most commonly on contributions based on salaries and wages, a lower 
wage share on aggregate output automatically leads to lower revenue being collected within the social 
security system, while there is a somewhat larger tax base for corporate taxes. The wealth generated by 
workers that is subsequently transformed into corporate profit rarely enters the base for social security 
contributions into the PAYG social security system. 
1 According to the definition of the Eurostat (2013), the gross operating surplus is the excess amount of money that is earned by 
the enterprise once labor costs are subtracted. Mixed income means the type of income generated by unincorporated enterprises 
(e.g. small farmers), where the income generated by capital and labor cannot be clearly distinguished.   
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Furthermore, the transformation of aggregate output into profit also means there is more 
tax to collect using corporate and personal income taxation. Thus, the general state budget suffers 
somewhat less due to the trend of rising profit shares and declining wage shares of aggregate output 
than does the social security system. Nevertheless, dominant views in pension politics often ignore 
these circumstances. The necessity to transfer money from the general state budget into social security 
system is often argued to be a clear evidence for a pension crisis. Little attention is paid to the fact that 
this is not the consequence of declining gross domestic product, but rather a structural problem of an 
economy in which the share of wages on the aggregate product is low. Low wages in turn lead to the 
lack of sufficient funding for the social security system. 
3 .  T H E  P O L I T I C A L  I M P L I C AT I O N S  O F  F D I - D E P E N D E N C E  F O R  T H E  
P E N S I O N  S Y S T E M
The above discussion shows that it is not sufficient to concentrate on productivity gains as a source of 
financing pension expenditures but that we have to consider how these gains are divided into wages 
and corporate profits. In this section, we turn to the political implications of FDI-dependence for the 
pension systems. We ask how CEE governments are coping with the pension crisis and what repertoire 
of reforms they used in order to solve it. We argue that, given the weak bureaucratic capacity and the 
hunger for FDI, in CEECs, there is only a limited space for governments to pass reforms that will solve 
the crisis of pensions in the long term. In this respect, parametric adjustments in the public PAYG 
pension systems, such as cuts in the contribution rates or shifting the burden of contributions towards 
employees have been used in order to make the pension systems more ‘employer friendly’. Given these 
restrictions faced by CEE governments, it is not a surprise that Western-like reforms which seek to 
transform the old welfare states into social investment states (Morel, Palier, and Palme 2012; Hemerijck 
2013) are unlikely to receive support. A simple comparison of statistical data on expenditure on active 
labor market policies (ALMPs) between East and West reveals a divided continent.
Intra-regional competition for FDI translated into considerable pressures to reduce tax rates. 
First, as Bohle and Greskovits (2012) point out, the manufacturing miracles of the CEECs have been 
accompanied by a tough bidding war between the regional leaders in FDI attraction. The corporate tax 
rate of Poland fell by ten percentage points, from forty per cent to thirty per cent between 1989 and 
2000. Parallel to this process, personal income taxes were increased (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). Cass 
(2007) provides further detail on the practices of FDI-attraction in the region. In 2005, 87 per cent 
of the CEECs were offering tax holidays to FDI and sixty per cent provided some type of grant. This 
shows that the bidding war for FDI is not a passing phenomenon typical for early transition years. In 
fact, Cass (2007) concludes that competition among the region’s countries is becoming more intense 
over time. In line with these processes, wage increases have been lagging behind productivity increases. 
In fact, some of the strategic documents endorsed by CEE governments and the public statements 
of leading politicians (e.g. Slovak Academy of Sciences-Institute of Economics 2008; Government of 
Romania 2014) reveal that low wages are still seen as an important competitive advantage. This implies 
that using wage competition in order to attract FDI might remain an option also into the long-term 
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future. In congruence with this view, according to Eurostat data, the per-hour labor costs in Slovakia, 
one of the region’s leaders in FDI attraction, were approximately ten euros in 2014 as opposed to the 
25-euro average in the EU-27. Thus, the hourly costs of employing a worker in Slovakia, wages, taxes 
and social-security contributions included, reached about forty per cent of the EU-wide average. In the 
meantime productivity per hour worked reached approximately 76 per cent of the EU average (data for 
2013), indicating a considerable gap between workers’ productivity and the wage they receive.2 
Second, and closely related to the previous point, the social security programs of CEE competition 
states have been transformed in order to fit the needs of the employers. This process has been particularly 
visible in Bulgaria, where employers’ social security contributions were cut from 28.6 per cent to 10.1 
per cent in the 1999-2010 period, while the deficit of the social security system gradually soared. The 
reasoning behind this dramatic cut in the social security contribution rates was exactly that the country 
needs to become more attractive for foreign investors (Tafradjiyski et al., 2002). Furthermore, the hope 
was that the decrease in social security contributions will automatically improve tax receipts by giving 
employers an incentive to move out from the grey economy. As naïve as it might seem, this policy 
direction received considerable support from the WB whose influence in Bulgarian pension reforms 
grew significantly after the economic crisis of the late 90s. 
Figure 2: Changes in Contribution rates by status (left axis) and State Subsidies to the Social 
Protection Budget (right axis) in Bulgaria: 2000 - 2011
Source: National Social Security Institute of Bulgaria (http://www.nssi.bg).
2 For more details, see Eurostat database, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database, series nama_aux_lp on labor productivity 
and Eurostat (2015) on wages and labor costs.
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As Figure 2 shows, the decrease in the social security contribution rates has had an enormous 
budgetary impact. No less than 60 per cent of the social security outlays were financed through 
budgetary subsidies in 2010. In response to this crisis, the conservative Borisov government passed 
a pension reform package in 2011 that increased the contribution rates by 1.8 percentage points– a 
change that is unlikely to have a considerable impact on the social security deficit. Other changes led 
to austerity in the pension system by introducing higher retirement ages for both men and women and 
longer contributory periods for obtaining full benefits. The reform has therefore focused on measures 
that seek to improve the sustainability of the pension system at the expense of benefit adequacy. 
Thirdly, because both employers and governments perceive the welfare state as a cost that hinders 
economic growth, measures that promote social investment (ALMPs, active ageing, lifelong learning) 
are unlikely to receive political support in CEECs. Indeed, as Figure 3 shows, total expenditure on 
labor market policies in CEECs is much lower in comparison with Western Europe.  Moreover, despite 
the fact that the WB, has recently shifted its focus towards a social investment view concerning older 
workers (Schwarz et al. 2014)  this ideational shift had little impact on the political discourses about 
pension reforms in CEECs.  On the contrary, as the crisis hit these economies, the repertoire of possible 
solutions was quickly reduced to austerity measures.
Figure 3: Total expenditure on LMPs in 2009 (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat database: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database, series lmp_ind_exp.
Empirical evidence on employers’ strategies towards older workers shows that in CEECs, companies 
prefer to ‘push’ older workers out of the labor market as a strategy to cut labor costs. As a recent case 
study by Perek-Białas and Turek (2012) has shown, relatively more advanced CEECs, such as Poland, 
are no exception from this.. In this particular case, the tendency to get rid of older workers might have 
its roots in Poland’s decade-long tradition of reliance on early retirement policies instead of meaningful 
productive integration into the labor market (e.g. Vanhuysse 2006). Nevertheless, this approach to 
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elderly workers is becoming untenable, as Polish policy-makers have been gradually removing the major 
early exit options from the pension system, and incorporating sizeable incentives for a longer working 
life (Chłoń-Domińczak 2009). The Active Ageing Index, a joint project of the European Commission 
and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (Zaidi et al. 2013), indicates that lagging 
behind in the provision of policies appropriately addressing the ageing of the labor force is typical for 
the CEECs as a whole. Importantly, it is not only the current situation in which the CEECs seem to 
be behind the West. There appears to be a general lack of favorable conditions enabling active ageing. 
The CEECs generally received a very negative evaluation on the “Capacity and enabling environment” 
dimension of the index. In fact, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Latvia and Romania assumed the last five 
places out of all 27 EU member states (Zaidi et al. 2013). 
C O N C L U S I O N S
In this paper, we argued that the root of the crisis of public pension systems lies in whether productivity 
increases can cover pension outlays. Due to specific structural condions, especially their reliance on 
FDI, capital openness and weak labor, CEECs have a limited ability to attain shares in productivity 
increases. We contended that because of the region’s distinct variety of integrating into world markets, 
productivity increases are not necessarily reflected into wage increases, which creates problems for the 
pension system if benefits are not to be reduced to merely cover poverty levels. The paper also shows 
that the dominating international discourses about pension reform alternatives have shifted over the 
past twenty years from an adamant advocacy for mandatory private accounts towards recognizing that 
‘parametric’ reforms might be a more suited solution for solving the problems that public PAYG pension 
systems face. 
However, even if the WB nowadays seems to have shifted its discourse about pension reforms, it 
is not clear in which direction its preferences for pension reform will sway. Some argue that post-crisis 
pension reforms will lead to a ‘rebirth’ of the privatization paradigm comprising new sets of policies 
such as funded minimum pensions, notional defined contributions or quasi-mandatory occupational 
pensions (Orenstein 2011). This move towards individualization through alternative paths seems to be 
plausible, especially if we factor in the bias against anything state run in CEECs. Nevertheless, much of 
the debate on defined-benefit, defined-contribution and notional-defined contribution schemes appears 
as an obfuscation of the more substantial issue related to FDI, wage levels and their implications for the 
political economy of pension reforms in the CEECs. 
Besides, the CEE governments have the option of passing politically sensitive reforms such as 
increases in the retirement ages or financing public PAYG outlays from the general budget – a trend 
that is especially visible in the less advanced transition economies. Increases in retirement ages have 
been already legislated in most of the CEECs in spite of opposition from workers.  In this sense, the 
recent crisis provided a momentum for retrenching public pension systems through the usage of the 
same ‘coercive’ policy measures that dominate the pension reform agenda ever since the beginning of 
the transition. Yet, as we outlined in the sections above, their fiscal impact might be minimal in the 
absence of a capable state. 
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Also, as we argued in the previous sections, the discussion about ageing in CEECs misses one 
important issue, which is the bias of employers against older workers.  To some degree, this bias was 
fed by the liberalization of early retirement policies that were passed in several CEECs in the 1990s. As 
this approach becomes unsustainable, governments in the region might attempt to persuade employers 
to alter their attitude towards older workers.  Nevertheless, the data suggest that, until now, investment 
in public policies to do so has been rather limited. 
The developmental model followed by the CEECs in the past decades, that is characterized 
by reliance on FDI, and thus increasing competition for attracting such investment, has influenced 
significantly the social-policy reforms these countries undertook. However, probably more importantly, 
FDI-reliance appears to have dire consequences for social policy, pensions included, also in the long-run, 
as it locks nations in a low‒pay‒low‒pension state. Therefore, developing other comparative advantage 
than just low labor costs is crucial for increasing the ability of CEECs to address the challenge of 
demographic ageing.
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